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Abstract
Before the mid-20th century, the most successful attempt to automatize mathematics was made by Charles
Babbage in his Analytical Engine. By explaining the steps necessary for the machine to perform the task, Luigi
Menabrea left little doubt that if an Analytical Engine could be built, it could solve two simultaneous linear
equations in two unknowns. The same may be said of description given by Lady Lovelace of the computation
of the Bernoulli numbers. However, despite repeated suggestions that it could also handle symbolic manipulation,
the lack of similar specifics indicates otherwise. In this respect, the Analytical Engine followed a long tradition of
claims about early calculators.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Résumé
Depuis le début du dixseptième siècle, il y eut un certain nombre de tentatives pour automatiser les mathé-
matiques. Mais, en fait, aucune de ses tentatives n’a atteint les espoirs des enthousiastes. Avant du mi-vingtième
siècle, la tentative la plus réussie fut celle de Charles Babbage, avec sa Machine Analytique. Lorsque Luigi
Menabrea eut analysé les étapes successive à franchir pour que la machine remplisse sa tâche, il n’y eut plus
de doute que la machine, une fois constuite, pourrait résoudre deux équations linéaires simultanées avec deux
inconnues. Tout de même, Lady Lovelace décrivit le calcul des nombres de Bernoulli. On a souvent suggéré que la
machine pourrait aussie effectuer des calculs symboliques, mais personne n’a montré comment la machine pourrait
les traiter. De ce point de vue la Machine Analytique a eu le même destin que les machines les plus anciennes. Les
affirmations sur ses capacités reposaient sur une grand admiration pour son inventeur, sur son besoin de financement
et de re-connaissence, sur le fait que les plupart des enthousiastes ignoraient presque tout les problèmes techniques
liés à cette entreprise et aussi sur le fait que la machine n’a jamais été construite.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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opened out, and I pursued with enthusiasm the shadowy vision.
— Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, Chapter VIII
1. Introduction
Charles Babbage (1791–1871) is rightly famed for his ingenious attempts to design mechanical
computing machines. His first machine, conceived about 1820, was intended to automatically produce
tables of the numerical values of mathematical functions. The overall operation depended on the fact that
many functions can be approximated, for short distances at least, by polynomials, and successive values
of polynomials can be arrived at by repeated additions of several order of differences between terms.
Hence, the Difference Engine, as it was called, performed only the operations of addition and sub-
traction. Babbage succeeded in obtaining a government grant for its construction, which ended up being
worth over £17,000, but the difficulties of some of the practical details involved meant that only a portion
of a small-scale model, intended mostly for demonstration purposes, could be produced. At this point
politics intervened, and it was nine years before changing governments could be brought to a definite
(and negative) decision regarding further funding for the machine.
In the meantime, Babbage was inspired by the vision of a far more general calculator that could
perform multiplication and division as well as addition and subtraction, and, in theory, could be instructed
in advance to proceed through a succession of different operations. This he dubbed the Analytical Engine
and left, both in his own writings and the statements of others, hints that its powers would extend beyond
the manipulation of numbers to that of symbols. This claim has, over the succeeding century and a half,
created considerable confusion in evaluating Babbage’s contribution to modern computing, since it was
as late as 1952, despite decades of interest, that, according to general consensus, machine algebra was
finally achieved.1 In this respect at least, Babbage’s engines were preceded by earlier attempts to automate
mathematics. The issues of whether the Analytical Engine could operate on symbols, who first articulated
the claim that it could, and why Lovelace was induced to make such a claim, were first discussed in Stein
[1985].
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the claims made for Babbage’s Analytical Engine that it
could “transcend number,” and to argue that the fact that the machine was never actually constructed
facilitated the confusion over the limits of its powers.
The major sources of information about Babbage’s Analytical Engine are, in addition to Babbage’s
correspondence, his notebooks and manuscripts, his accounts in his memoirs, Passages from the Life of a
Philosopher [Babbage, 1864], and The Exposition of 1851 [Babbage, 1851], and those of his publicists,
whose work was actually produced under his supervision and with his approval. In 1841, Babbage went to
Turin, where he gave a series of lectures describing his plans for the Analytical Engine. A young military
engineer, Captain Luigi Menabrea, took notes by arrangement. These were worked up in subsequent
correspondence with Babbage into an article published in the Bibliothèque Universelle de Genève in
October, 1842. This article was then translated into English by Ada, Countess of Lovelace, and with the
addition of lengthy notes over the initials AAL but prepared with Babbage’s even closer supervision,
1 In that year H.G. Kahrimanian [1953] and J. Nolan [1953] simultaneously, in almost identically titled M.A. theses,
announced their programs that could be used to differentiate a variety of familiar functions of a single variable.
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1842].2 Since Lady Lovelace was not only the daughter of Lord Byron, but, on her mother’s side, a cousin
of Lord Melbourne, the prime minister who had been influential enough to secure her husband’s earldom,
Babbage hoped to get even more favorable publicity from her translation and notes, the authorship of
which, despite the discreet initials, was no secret.
2. A slight history of attempts to automate mathematical procedures
Nevertheless, in constantly perfecting it, I have found reasons to change it, and finally recognizing in all these reasons, whether
of difficulty of operation, or in the roughness of its movements, or in the disposition to get out of order too easily by weather
or by transportation, I have had the patience to make as many as fifty models, wholly different, . . . , before having arrived at the
accomplishment of this machine which I now make known.
— Blaise Pascal, from an advertisement for his invention
Aside from devices such as the abacus, which could provide only very limited assistance in performing
calculations, the first mechanical calculator of which there are known records was invented by Wilhelm
Schickard in 1623. Schickard was a professor of Oriental languages at the University of Tübingen, but
also a geographer and an astronomer. His machine was documented in two letters written to his friend
Johannes Kepler, and a couple of sketches and notes, apparently for the benefit of the workman employed
to build the device.
Although, in his letters to Kepler, Schickard wrote that he had built a model of his machine, no copy
of it has been found, and there are no records of anyone else having examined it. In a letter dated
20 September 1623, Schickard wrote Kepler with great enthusiasm, saying, “What you have done by
calculation I have lately attempted to do with a machine that has one whole and six partial wheels,
which, when given the numbers automatically computes, adds, subtracts, multiplies and divides. You
would certainly laugh in admiration to see how this machine accumulates and automatically moves the
left columns by tens and hundreds, and how, on the other hand, it deducts the remainders when the
purpose is subtraction.”3 In a letter dated February 24, 1624, he gave further details and enclosed a
sketch. In the same letter, he explained that he had been having a model built to send to Kepler, when it
was destroyed by fire. Curiously, although he lived a further 11 years, he never seems to have returned
to the task of constructing his machine, and no further mention of it appears in his correspondence with
Kepler.
There is no evidence that the Schickard machine had any influence on attempts by Blaise Pascal to
build a mechanical calculator some 15 years later. In a thoughtful essay comparing the histories of the
two inventions, René Taton suggested that perhaps the reason Schickard never seems to have attempted
to replace the model destroyed in the fire was that he realized that he had not completely overcome the
technical difficulties involved—difficulties he had not communicated to his friend but which perhaps
2 A discussion of the correspondence between Babbage and Lady Lovelace during the period of the writing of the “Notes”
is contained in Dorothy Stein, Ada, a Life and a Legacy [Stein, 1985].
3 The original of this letter does not now survive, but it was published in 1718 and is reproduced in Johannes Kepler,
Gesammelte Werke, Band XVIII: Briefe 1620–1630 [Hammer, 1959]. The authors are grateful to Professor Robert Sharples,
Department of Greek and Latin, University College, London, for help in interpreting this famous letter.
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model, which Schickard had built for himself, also disappeared mysteriously.)
But it was the fact that news of Schickard’s creation never appears to have penetrated scientific
circles in Paris (where it might have influenced Pascal’s later attempts) that led Taton to formulate more
specific conditions for the recognition of a mechanical invention: it must have been authenticated by
recognized authorities, and then distributed and put into the service for which it was designed. Thus
Schickard, in Taton’s opinion, cannot be recognized as the inventor of the first calculating machine.
The construction of a modern example according to Schickard’s description, in Taton’s view, did not
undermine his conclusion, for “the most basic modern techniques are capable of a precision greater
than that achievable by the most skillful builders of the early 17th century, and, moreover, modern
reconstructions are achieved by specialists who are already familiar with the engineering of current
calculating machines” [Taton, 1963].
The attempt to reconstruct the Schickard machine referred to above was that of Baron Bruno von
Freytag Löringhoff, himself a mathematics professor at Tübingen [von Freytag Löringhoff, 1978]. This
is said to function satisfactorily with regard to addition and subtraction, but multiplication, division, and
the extraction of square roots require recourse to an attachment which referred to “Napier’s bones.” These
are strips on which columns of the multiplication table are inscribed. By arranging them correctly, the
user need only perform a series of simple additions to complete a multiplication problem; the process
ended up being very similar to the ancient “gelosia” method of multiplication. When using the bones,
the operator has to enter the addition problem into the adding machine part. The process of division is
also carried out through Napier’s bones, and therefore it is not really automatic in the current sense of the
word.
To the extent that von Freytag Löringhoff’s reproduction is accepted as a valid embodiment of
Schickard’s design, it appears that even the original invention was really intended to assist in operating
the device invented by John Napier, and, whatever position is taken, modern examination of the sketches
that Schickard made indicate that it was primarily an adding machine. Moreover, had he received it,
Kepler may have found the copy of the device destroyed in the fire interesting as a curiosity, but it would
have been incapable of sufficient accuracy to be useful in his astronomical calculations.
It not surprising to find the constructor of the Schickard replica rejecting Taton’s criteria out of hand.4
Yet aside from an obvious contest of national pride involved, he is rather vague concerning the decisions
and guesses that might have been necessitated in his attempts to reconstruct Schickard’s machine from
the crude sketches and sparse detail left behind by the inventor. Nor did he give many details of the
principles applied in the construction, in particular, the extent to which compromises were made with
modern technology in the construction and/or materials used. That some were made is implied by several
circumstances and statements. For example:
(1) There is no mention of the use of any modern techniques or materials. However, the author describes
how he almost gave up the project until he and his mechanic discovered that one angle was cut at
94◦ instead of 90◦; thus a high degree of precision was demanded for the design to work. Was such
4 In his essay describing Schickard’s invention and its reproduction at his own hands, he said, “In this regard, we can pretty
well put aside the opinion of René Taton . . . [who] here stands in contradiction to his countryman, J.P. Fald, who wrote several
times of the priority of Schickard’s machine” [von Freytag Löringhoff, 1978, 300–301].
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his project? This point is not discussed.
(2) There is not much said about guessing either, but between the lines one can infer that there was
some involved. For example, the second sentence of the chapter on the building of the model
says, “The construction of the model confirmed our interpretation of the sources and deepened it
in some details.” One such “detail” may be found in the statement that “the machine generates a
very characteristic funny noise and this noise suddenly gave sense to some remarks in the letter of
Schickard to Kepler” [von Freytag Löringhoff, 1978, 304]. What he seems to be referring to here
is that his machine rattles, for he continues “. . . which makes the comment in the first letter ‘you
would laugh loudly if you could see in person’ understandable. Schickard’s machine surely rattled
similarly.” This is a curious statement because the “laugh out loud” comment in the first letter is
made in a context that has nothing to do with noise or rattling, and rather means that Kepler would
laugh in delight and admiration at the operation of the machine.
(3) On one occasion von Freytag Löringhoff admits (in the context of one particular operation) “we do
not know how Schickard did it, or how Schickard determined it, or what the difference between these
‘very similar’ wheels and the other ones was.”5
In sum, then, the clarity of Taton’s criteria, whether one agrees with them or not, seems more
congenial to the modern scientist, engineer, or historian than the somewhat vague assertions of von
Freytag Löringhoff, who leaves several questions without clear answers.
In 1642, Blaise Pascal independently created his first of several automatic addition machines. Although
they could not perform multiplication, they were capable of greater accuracy than Schickard’s machine,
due to a superior carry mechanism. At first glance, the attestation of Pascal’s arithmetic machine seems
less problematic than that of Schickard’s. Pascal not only submitted his machine to authoritative scrutiny,
but made strenuous efforts to market it, even using the still-popular technique of presenting free models
to influential royal figures. Moreover, Pascal’s work served to inspire later famous attempts to mechanize
mathematics, first Gottfried Leibniz’s, and then Babbage’s, for the 1834 edition of Pascal’s sister’s
memoir states in a footnote by the editor, M.L. Aime-Martin, “Recently, in England, a famous engineer
named Babbage, following the same inspiration, has succeeded in designing a mathematical machine
that solves the most complicated problems and calculates, like an astronomer, the movements of the
stars and the recurrence of the eclipses. Thus, the invention of Pascal has been the starting point of this
wonderful invention”6 [Périer, 1834; emphasis in the original]. The story of “La Pascaline” was recorded
rather romantically in the memoir of his life by his sister, Gilberte Périer, who informs us that at the age
of 19 he invented a machine “by which one could do not only all sorts of calculations without pen or
counter [the practical method used by many merchants in the 17th century], and even without knowing
any of the rules of arithmetic, but with unfailing reliability” [Périer, 1834, 3]. Pascal himself wrote, in his
advertisement for the device, “Dear reader, this notice will serve to inform you that I submit to the public
a small machine of my invention, by means of which you alone may, without any effort, perform all the
operations of arithmetic” [Pascal, 1929].
5 The authors are grateful to Werner Seiler for his help in interpreting von Freytag Löringhoff’s essay.
6 At so early a date, the information about the Analytical Engine must have come from Babbage himself.
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only add and subtract. Among the earlier critics was Leibniz, who said, “Pascal’s machine is an example
of the most fortunate genius but while it facilitates only additions and subtractions, the difficulty of which
is not very great in themselves, it commits the multiplication and division to a previous calculation so
that it commended itself rather by refinement to the curious than as of practical use to people engaged in
business affairs” [Leibniz, 1929, 180]. As if this were not deficiency enough, Pascal’s machine needed
help even with subtraction. As Michael Williams explained, “The upper window was for normal addition
while the lower window, which displayed the nines complement of the number held in the accumulator,
was used for subtraction. This arrangement was necessary because, due to the internal construction of
the machine, it was not possible to turn the dials backward in order to do subtraction . . . the subtraction
problem was solved by simply adding the nines complement of the required number, a process which
limited the use of the machine to those with a better than average education”7 [Williams, 1985, 131,
133]. And Williams concluded his comments with, “None of the surviving models functions very well,
and it is doubtful if they functioned perfectly even in Pascal’s day. The mechanism, although ingenious,
is rather delicate and prone to giving erroneous results when not treated with the utmost care.”
Leibniz, on his own account, was first inspired to automate all of arithmetic upon viewing a pedometer,
which merely counted the steps taken by a walker. When he heard that Pascal had apparently beaten him
to his goal, he asked a friend for a description, on the basis of which he decided he could do better, and
his friend encouraged him to lay his plans before the King’s Academy in Paris.
His plans were to build on and improve Pascal’s device:
In the first place it should be understood that there are two parts of the machine, one designed for addition (subtraction) the other for
multiplication (division) and that they should fit together. The adding (subtracting) machine coincides completely with the calculating
box of Pascal. Something, however, must be added for the sake of multiplication so that several and even all the wheels of addition
could rotate without disturbing each other, and nevertheless any one of them should precede the other in such a manner that after a
single complete turn unity would be transferred into the next following. If this is not performed by the calculating box of Pascal it
may be added to it without difficulty. [Leibniz, 1929, 174]
What this “something” consisted of was more wheels, and, in particular, a kind of cylinder with stepped
teeth now known as the “Leibniz wheel.” This description appeared in a document supposedly dated
1685, but it is not clear from the document whether the description was a late inspiration coming on top
of a string of earlier discarded ideas, or whether this was the device which he showed in Paris to the
Academie des Sciences and to the Royal Society in London.
Strangely enough, there is even some dispute over whether Leibniz ever built his extension, how
many he built, when he built them, and whether it or they worked well, badly, or at all. The crux of
the problem seems to hinge on the fact that the only extant model does not work properly. This model
was discovered in an attic in Göttingen in 1879, before being deposited in Hanover, so it is not even
certain that it represented one of Leibniz’ designs. It is Williams’s opinion that the extension planned
by Leibniz would have been impossible to operate, and therefore was never built. Williams wrote, “We
don’t know if Leibnitz ever actually saw one of Pascal’s machines, but we do know that, at least in
his early years, he did not completely understand the workings of the device. In Leibnitz’s notes is a
series of suggestions and drawings for an attachment to be placed on top of Pascal’s device in order
to enable it to perform multiplication.” After describing the attachment, Williams continues, “Although
7 The nines complement method transforms subtraction into a form of addition.
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one wheel of Pascal’s machine at any given instant. Presumably Leibnitz either found this out, or the
pressure of other work caused him to put the idea aside until it no longer had any relevance, for he never
seems to have continued in this line of thought” [Williams, 1985, 136]. However, in a paper written
in the early part of the 20th century, L. Leland Locke argued that the machine described in the 1685
document simply represented an early design, superseded by the one at Hanover, which had its own
shortcomings.
As will appear later, the machine here described does not in any way correspond to the Hannover [sic] machine. It is this fact, together
with the report of a successful demonstration of a machine by Leibniz and the known failure of the Hannover machine, which gives
support to the argument for two machines. This manuscript is supposed to have been written in 1685. If our chronology is correct as
to the date of the first machine, 1694, the argument for a second machine has no validity. In addition, the machine described in the
manuscript may be classified as wholly inoperative. The manuscript may be assumed to be a preliminary report of his progress at the
time and a survey of what he expected to accomplish. [Locke, 1933]
If such controversy can arise when there is apparently a surviving model of a calculating machine; it
is not surprising that the evaluation of an invention that did not survive is controversial, and that that of
one that was never built should be even more so.
Both Pascal and Leibniz end their notes stressing the importance of building the machine rather than
relying on plans. Pascal boasted proudly, “I have had the patience to make as many as fifty models,
wholly different, . . . , before having arrived at the accomplishment of this machine which I now make
known” [Pascal, 1929, 172]. And Leibniz wrote, “What I have said about the construction and future
use [of the machine], should be sufficient, and I believe will become absolutely clear to the observers
[when completed]” [Leibniz, 1929, 181]. Leibniz’s remark, of course, becomes particularly interesting
if, as Williams said, he was discussing a machine that could not be built.
Several other calculators were designed and built before Babbage’s Difference Engine, and there were
attempts to mass-produce some of them, but aside from design flaws, the technology did not yet exist
to create gears that were sufficiently accurate and sufficiently strong for these machines to be practical.
One of the major problems in the development of mechanical calculators was that of making, in the
minimum possible time, “carries” from one order of numbers into the next higher when the sum of
numbers entered into the lower order exceeded the highest digit. The pedometer that inspired Leibniz
was a simple counter; that is, entries could be made only in the “lowest order,” namely the “ones.” In
Pascal’s machine, entries could be made in any order (i.e., tens, hundreds, etc.). However, entries to each
order had to be operated separately. Otherwise, a carry from one order to the next could be lost if the
wheels of both were moving simultaneously. Leibniz eventually proposed the “delayed carry” in which
the latter part of the turn resulting in addition is used for the carry from one order to the next. This “latter
part of the cycle” could take up to two thirds of the cycle, and, moreover, no more than two or at most
three carries could be progressed in a single cycle. Thus, if a number had more than two or three nines
in a row, and a one was added to the lowest order, the carry would be lost when it progressed to the
highest one. Locke suggested that the loss of a carry at the highest order may not have been noticed
during Leibniz’ demonstrations [Locke, 1933, 321].
Babbage’s plans were superior to those that preceded him by the development of the “anticipating
carry,” in which potential carries are “hoarded” separately during the cycle of the operation of addition,
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orders of numbers are involved [Babbage, 1864, Chapter VII].8
The early calculators, then, had no large effect on the scientific community, and by Babbage’s time
many scientific calculations were done by referring to tables, which were often inaccurate thanks
to miscalculations or slipshod typesetting. In 1826 Babbage published what were probably the most
accurate tables of logarithms of his day, accomplished not by redoing the calculations but by comparing
several independently calculated tables, looking for common values, and having the typeset results
carefully proofread. Even this method permitted errors, which had earlier inspired Babbage with the idea
of creating a machine that would make the necessary calculations and typeset them all automatically.
This first venture into calculating engines, which he called the Difference Engine, led him in due course
to design a yet more general and automatic machine, the Analytical Engine.
Given the controversies and uncertainties that arise when older attempts at mechanizing mathematics
are known only from documentary evidence—sketches, letters, descriptions, and plans—attempting to
construct or replicate such machines, using the inventors’ concepts and whatever details survive, despite
the controversy over Baron von Freytag Löringhoff’s reconstruction, still seems an obvious way to
determine the practicality or flaws, difficulties or efficiencies of operation of these early devices. As
Allan Bromley stated in his proposal to construct the Difference Engine, “Construction . . . would not
only confirm the soundness of Babbage’s logical and mechanical design principles in this case but would
also lend conviction to the entire range of his designs for automatic computing engines.”9
Although none of these modern attempts directly concerns the Analytical Engine, all seem to have
implications and relevance to the problems surrounding the nature of Babbage’s attempt to create an
automatic arithmetic machine—let alone an algebraic computer. The most recent, most elaborate, and,
as will be seen, perhaps the most candid of these attempts was that of the Science Museum in London,
which was written up in elaborate detail by Doron Swade, the Assistant Director and Head of Collections
there, and a central figure on the project [Swade, 2000].
There were other reasons put forth by Bromley in his proposal for the choice of Babbage’s Difference
Engine (No. 2) over the Analytical Engine. By the early 1840s, despite his encouragement of Lady
Lovelace’s proselytizing efforts on behalf of the Analytical Engine, Babbage gradually lost the creative
will to finish its design, and his efforts descended into rather aimless pottering, perhaps out of increasing
despair that its construction would ever be funded, which eventually induced boredom with the whole
project. In 1846, he turned again more seriously to his Difference Engine, with the intent of applying all
the new knowledge and simplifications that he had developed during his experience with the Analytical
Engine to a complete set of drawings for the Difference Engine, so complete, he felt, that anyone in the
future with the will and finances to build it could realize its creator’s dream. This was the Difference
Engine No. 2, which the Science Museum project successfully achieved at the end of the 20th century.
Bromley’s intimate knowledge of the design convinced him that it could not only be constructed, but
would work. It was, moreover, the only one of Babbage’s designs that could possibly be executed in
time for the 200th anniversary of Babbage’s birth. The chief reason for choosing the Difference Engine,
8 He then added, “A few more units of time, perhaps five or six, were required for making the requisite previous
arrangements.” Allan Bromley describes the mechanism involved in “Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine, 1838” [Bromley,
1998].
9 Allan Bromley, quoted in The Cogwheel Brain [Swade, 2000].
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emphatically not be said for the Analytical Engine.
Preliminary consideration indicated that the precision attainable by engineering techniques in
Babbage’s time was adequate to produce a reliable and serviceable device. Nevertheless, the project was
immediately embroiled in a variety of questions. Just what would constitute an “authentic” embodiment
of Babbage’s plans? Just what metals and other materials should be used? How pure were those available
to Babbage at the time? And how were they to be finished? Just what techniques, from among those
currently available, would it be permissible to use? Exactly what were the dimensions envisaged?
On closer examination, a “range of oversights and errors of varying seriousness” were identified. Most
surprising, however, was a design that drove the wheel of a carry mechanism in the wrong direction,
which would have seized up the engine, and this of course had to be redesigned. The ensuing dilemma
was expressed by Swade in the following terms: “If the engine was built as drawn by Babbage, we had
no expectation that it would work . . . [T]he outcome would be an intriguing piece of Victorian sculpture,
but the venture would prove nothing about whether Babbage’s Engines were viable or not. If, on the
other hand, the design was modified, in what sense could the new Engine claim to vindicate Babbage’s
work?” [Swade, 2000, 238]. Put that way—that a nonfunctional engine built according to the original
designs proved nothing, but one with modifications that worked might do so—the solution was almost
unavoidable, “[t]he way out of this impasse came when we realized that it was a mistake to see Babbage’s
design drawings as some sacrosanct entity of unimpeachable perfection. The attempt to build the Engine
was not the physical realisation of an abstract ideal embodied in the drawings. It was instead a resumption
of a practical engineering project that had been arrested in 1849 . . . .” The problem then became, at each
point, “how, given the tools, practice and precedent of his day, would Babbage himself have solved these
problems?” In the event, some other compromises with modern technology had to be made in the interests
of saving time, if nothing else. For example, a “very un-Victorian electric drill” was used in the process
of assembling the thousands of moving parts (and the debris from the drilling sucked up with a vacuum
cleaner).
The machine worked, and the detail and honesty of the account of what was involved in building it
serves as a standard against which other modern attempts to build or replicate other early calculators may
be measured.
A rather different light is shed on the issue of modern attempts to build or replicate lost early
calculators by an attempt to replicate a machine that was never even conceived by its “inventor,” none
other than Leonardo da Vinci. As one account put it, a Leonardo expert and replica builder named
Dr. Roberto Guatelli was struck, in 1967, by a drawing of Leonardo’s that appeared in the recently
discovered Madrid Codex I.10 He set about building a replica which was for a while exhibited by IBM.
It consisted of a set of gear wheels, meshed together in such a way that a complete revolution in one
produced only one tenth of a turn in its neighbor to one side.
After questions were raised about the extent to which the “replica” exceeded the information left by
Leonardo, it was withdrawn. In producing his replica, it seems Dr. Guatelli neglected to read the caption
which Leonardo had inserted beneath the drawing, which characterized the illustration as a device for
mechanical advantage, and not a calculator at all. Leonardo wrote “This method is similar to that of
10 The “Madrid Codices” are two of Leonardo’s notebooks found in the National Library of Spain, which had been overlooked
until in 1967. The story of the claim that one of the drawings represented a computer may be found in an article by Erez Kaplan,
http://www.webcom.com/calc/leonardo/leonardo.html [1996].
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between them except that this, being made with toothed wheels and their pinions, has continuity in its
motion of which the instrument with simple levers is deprived” [da Vinci, 1974].11 Leonardo intended
his sketch to illustrate an instrument for producing mechanical advantage, rather than as a calculator.
Yet even devices that were intended as calculators were liable to inspire exaggerated claims in
admiring and enthusiastic observers and promoters. Gilberte Périer’s assertions did not stop at claiming
a reliability and certainty that the actual machine fell short of, for she went on to imply that her brother’s
invention was nothing less than a thinking machine, saying, “This work has been considered as a new
phenomenon for having reduced to mechanism a science that resides totally in the mind, and having
found the way to do all its operations with certainty and with no need for [human] reasoning” [Périer,
1834, 3].
How then can machines that were never built be evaluated? Let us return to Babbage’s plans for
the Analytical Engine. Babbage adopted the geared wheels used by Pascal and Leibniz, but he greatly
extended the number and nature of operations that could be effected without human intervention.
3. The mechanism of the Analytical Engine
I never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it. As long
as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot understand . . .
— William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, Baltimore Lecture XX
While Babbage’s designs for his Analytical Engine were never finalized, after 1838 they underwent
little change in the important features. The Engine was conceptually and physically divided into:
a “store,” or memory, in which numbers could be stored until needed for processing and, if necessary,
returned to after processing, and a “mill,” or processing unit, where the operations were mainly
performed. In the store, numbers were represented on columns consisting of stacks of metal disks, each
disk bearing the numerals 0 through 9 evenly spaced around its circumference. The disks were separated
by toothed wheels, which could be connected to slotted racks or pinions that could rotate them, changing
the numbers that were lined up on a reference vertical. The disk columns which stored the numbers and
on which the mathematical operations were performed were a decimal system, since each disk would
have the ten primary digits engraved on its edge and could be rotated in increments of one digit. There
was therefore necessarily a unit difference between a digit and the digits on either side at the same level.
The engine had the capability of “shifting” a column up or down a level, which was to represent
multiplication or division by 10, and so digits on a given level differed by those on the level above or
below it by a factor of 10. Since there was no floating (that is, movable) decimal point in Babbage’s
plans, there was a fixed relation between digits on different columns as well. (The decimal point was
apparently set in advance of calculations by means of a “handwheel.”) That is, an 8 on the third disk
from the bottom of a column was four units removed from a 4 on the third disk from the bottom of any
other column, and ten times an 8 on the second disk from the bottom of any column. The top disk of
each column was special, and was used to show whether the number placed below it was positive or
negative; it could be engraved with numbers or alternating plus and minus signs, but the manner in which
11 The sketch in question (with accompanying text by Leonardo) is on the verso of f36 of vol. I (translated by Ladislao Reti).
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numbers or two even numbers is even, while the sum of an odd and an even number is odd. Similarly, the
product of two positive or two negative numbers is positive, while the product of a positive and a negative
number is negative. When the numbers were multiplied (or divided), their sign disks were added.
The mill as well as the store had columns on which numbers were placed. Addition took place in the
mill, and, building on that, multiplication, division, and subtraction as well. After being processed by
the mill, the results could be returned to the store, or printed or output in some other fashion (such as
by a graph). Addition could be performed by rotating the disks of one column to zero as the disks of
another column connected to it by a rack were rotated an equal amount in the opposite direction. The
“anticipating carry” mechanism took care of the case when the value on the second wheel became greater
than 9. To transfer numbers from columns in the store to the mill, and back again if necessary, a similar
method was used, although since the disks on the target column were assumed to show 0, no carrying
was necessary.
One feature of which Babbage was justifiably proud and which gave great flexibility and power to
his planned machine was the ability to branch, or proceed from one type of operation to another when
some condition of the calculation was met. This could happen when a counting mechanism, activated
every time a particular cycle or loop was effected, reached the desired number of cycles, or when a
specified column was reduced to zero or reached its maximum capacity. Babbage worked the control
mechanism out in great detail at the microprogramming level, but, except for the possibilities opened by
the use of punched cards in sequence, was rather vague, inconsistent, and fluctuating about his higher-
level programming strategy.
Using punched cards, which would be strung together (and so would resemble a tape), as a means of
communicating the user’s data and instructions to the engine, was another of Babbage’s great inspirations.
He had planned three distinct sets of punched cards, each with its own card-feeding mechanism. One set
of cards was devoted to the operations, meaning, in this case, one of the four arithmetical processes:
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. A second set of cards ordered the storage and transfer
of “variables” between the store and the mill. Still another set of cards, the “number cards,” had the
values of numerical constants punched into them in coded form, and it was these numbers that constituted
the numerical operands. Babbage planned a clever scheme involving incomplete disks, which he called
“sectors,” to translate the holes punched into these cards into the digits appearing on the columns of disks.
A hole, representing a particular digit, activated a “sector” whose circumference was proportional to that
digit, and the revolution of the sector revolved a connected disk on a column until the corresponding
number appeared in the correct position. These cards too were to be fed into the Engine by means of their
own separate input mechanism.
The divisions of the Analytical Engine bore many similarities to the divisions of a modern computer,
but it also had some crucial differences. Modern computers embody both commands and data as binary
coded indicators in successive lines of program and in sets of “words” or “registers” in the memory.
Babbage and his publicists, however, stressed that in the Analytical Engine there was a strict separation
between operations and the objects being operated on. This separation entailed a physical embodiment
of the instructions (or operations) different from the columns on which the numbers operated on were to
be stored. The original reason for this separation was mechanical, namely, the complexity of Babbage’s
ingenious carry mechanism [Bromley, 1998, 33], but undoubtedly much of Babbage’s enchantment with
this separation was inspired by his study of mathematical notation, in which he emphasized notational
J. Belanger, D. Stein / Historia Mathematica 32 (2005) 76–93 87differences between operators and operands [Bromley, 1998, 43]. It is worth noting, however, that the
operators being ordered were arithmetic, and the operands numerical.
Ironically, it is with languages, such as LISP, where the distinction between operations and data
is purposely blurred that much, if not most, work in symbolic manipulation has been done. Another
crucial difference between the Analytical Engine and modern computers is that variable references (i.e.,
references to columns in the store which held the numbers to be operated on) could be made only through
mechanical linkages, and not through “addresses” or numbering of the columns. This caused difficulties
in some of the programs that Babbage tried to write for the Analytical Engine [Bromley, 1998, 44].
4. Potential capabilities of Babbage’s designs
It is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine. In
considering any new subject, there is frequently a tendency, first, to overrate what we find to be already interesting or remarkable; and
secondly, by a sort of natural reaction, to undervalue the true state of the case, when we do discover that our notions have surpassed
those that were really tenable.
— AAL, “Sketch,” p. 722
Babbage set out to create a machine much more general than the Difference Engine, and designed one
that was supposed to be able to compute very general functions. But could it do even more?
In the portion of the “Sketch of the Analytical Engine” written by Menabrea, the author was at
pains to point out the broad utility of an ability to compute a wide variety of functions. His discussion
demonstrated that the Analytical Engine could have been used to solve the simultaneous equations
mx + ny = d, m′x + n′y = d ′
for the unknowns x and y. The equations could be entered into the engine by placing the values of
m, n, d , m′, n′, and d ′ in predetermined columns. Solving for x and y then amounts to computing
(dn′ − d ′n)/(n′m − nm′) and (dm′ − d ′m)/(n′m − nm′), and Menabrea carefully showed how the
Analytical Engine could have been instructed to compute x, by indicating the order in which the
operations should be performed, the columns which contain the values the operations should be
performed on, and the columns on which the results should be placed.
Menabrea noted that multiplying polynomials required only the ability to add and multiply numbers,
and store them in specific locations:
When analysis is employed for the solution of any problem, there are usually two classes of operations to execute: first, the numerical
calculation of the various coefficients; and secondly, their distribution in relation to the quantities affected by them. If, for example,
we have to obtain the product of two binomials (a + bx)(m + nx), the result will be represented by am + (an + bm)x + bnx2, in
which expression we must first calculate am, an, bm and bn, then take the sum of an + bm; and lastly, respectively distribute the
coefficients thus obtained amongst the powers of the variable. In order to reproduce these operations by means of a machine, the latter
must therefore possess two distinct sets of powers: first, that of executing numerical calculations; secondly, that of rightly distributing
the values so obtained. [Menabrea, 1842]
The Analytical Engine would have possessed both of these sets of powers, and later Menabrea
demonstrates its ability to multiply (a + bx)(A + B cos(x)), where a, b, A, and B are numbers, and
x and cos(x) are variables, and then to “distribute the values” by placing them on designated columns.
(The fact that cos(x) depends on x is, in this example, irrelevant; x and cos(x) are merely two symbols
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the mechanism.)
The process described is purely numerical; the two expressions are entered into the Analytical Engine
by placing their coefficients a, b, A, and B onto predetermined columns. The multiplication of the
expressions is then done by placing the product aA on a column which has been reserved for the
constant term in the product, placing the product aB on a column which is reserved for the cos(x)
coefficient, placing the product bA on a column reserved for the x coefficient, and placing the product
bB on a column reserved for the x cos(x) coefficient. Thus the product of the expressions reduces to
straightforward numerical calculation, and x and cos(x) never really enter into it. The fact that a certain
column contains the x cos(x) coefficient, for example, is an interpretation that must be made by the user.
In presenting this example, Menabrea implicitly concedes that it is essentially the only way in which the
Analytical Engine could deal with nonnumerical expressions.
In her commentary on this example, Lady Lovelace noted that it was a simple one, meant only to
“explain the manner in which the engine would proceed in the case of an analytical calculation containing
variables.” She then proceeded to a more complicated calculation, that of multiplying a trigonometric
series,
A + A1 cos(θ) + A2 cos(2θ) + · · · ,
by
B + B1 cos(θ).
The procedure here was the same as Menabrea’s: enter the series by putting the coefficients on
predetermined columns, and placing the products of these coefficients on columns to be interpreted by
the user as containing the coefficients of terms of the product of the expression. The product will no
longer be a cosine series, since some terms, such as
B1A1 cos(θ) cos(θ),
will contain products of cosines. Ada then added that, using mathematical identities, such as
cos(θ) cos(θ) = (1/2) cos(2θ) + (1/2), the Analytical Engine could be programmed to manipulate the
numbers on the columns so the result would be in the form:
C + C1 cos(θ) + C2 cos(2θ) + · · · ,
which of course is indicated by having one column reserved for C, one column reserved for C1, etc.
Menabrea realized that the method he described could be a general method available to the Analytical
Engine. He wrote “Generally, since every analytical expression is susceptible of being expressed in a
series ordered according to certain functions of the variable, we perceive that the machine will include
all analytical calculations which can be definitely reduced to the formation of coefficients according
to certain laws, and to the distribution of these with respect to the variables” [Menabrea, 1842, 685].
However, even though the results are interpreted as coefficients of terms involving letter symbols by
the user, the Analytical Engine itself only manipulates numbers. Menabrea later again acknowledged
that this is essentially the only type of calculation that the Analytical Engine would be capable of,
writing “Considered under that most general point of view, the essential object of the machine being
to calculate, according to the laws dictated to it, the values of numerical coefficients which it is then to
distribute appropriately on the columns which represent the variables, it follows that the interpretation of
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of expression by means of the symbols which the machine employs” [Menabrea, 1842, 689].
While the Difference Engine was designed to be able to compute any single-variable polynomial up to
some arbitrary degree, the Analytical Engine was designed to be able to compute a much larger class of
functions. Lady Lovelace’s Notes ended on a bravura note with a demonstration of how it could be used
to compute the Bernoulli numbers.
After deriving the general formula for the numbers in a form particularly suited to the “illustration
of the powers of the engine,” she laid out the steps through which the engine would proceed in the
calculation of the Bernoulli number B7, which operations would be performed, which columns would be
operated upon, and which columns would receive the results. Although the Analytical Engine was never
built, this example provides a demonstration that a machine with the specific capabilities mentioned
above could indeed be used to compute the Bernoulli numbers. Without a working model, this is the kind
of precision and specificity on the basis of which we may conclude that such a calculation would have
been achievable.
5. On beyond numbers
In enabling mechanism to combine together general symbols, in successions of unlimited variety and extent, a uniting link is
established between the operations of matter and the abstract mental processes
— AAL, “Sketch,” p. 697
The Analytical Engine was designed to be much more powerful than the Difference Engine, and it
is not surprising that Babbage wanted to make it as powerful as possible. At one early point, Babbage
thought that it could be designed to handle symbolic calculations, writing, “This day I had for the first
time a general but very indistinct conception of the possibility of making an engine work out algebraic
developments—I mean without any reference to the value of the letter” [Babbage, vol. 2, D3, 3/5]. In
December 1837 his notebook reveals that he had returned to the problem and finally concluded that it
would be “better to construct a new machine for such purposes” [Babbage, vol. 3, D4, 3/9, 13 December
1837]. Yet in the Exposition of 1851, published eight years after the appearance of the “Sketch of the
Analytical Engine,” Babbage adverted once more to his ambitious dream:
I had frequently discussed with Mrs Somerville and . . . Professor M’Cullagh of Dublin, the question whether it was possible that we
should be able to treat algebraic formulae by means of machinery. The result of many inquiries led to the conclusion that, if not really
impossible, it was almost hopeless. The first difficulty was that of representing an indefinite number in a machine of finite size . . .
After lengthened consideration of this subject, the solution of the difficulty was discovered; and it presented the appearance of
reasoning in a circle. Algebraical operations in their most general form cannot be carried on by machinery without the capability of
expressing indefinite constants. On the other hand, the only way of arriving at the expression of an indefinite constant was through the
intervention of Algebra itself. This is not a fit place to enter into the detail of the means employed, further than to observe, that it was
found possible to evade the difficulty by connecting indefinite number with the infinite in time instead of with the infinite in space.
[Babbage, 1851, 184]
What he seems to be saying here is that the calculation could be continued by machine to as many decimal
places as the interested human had patience for, by computing the number as a series of terms.
Babbage did not treat decimals exponentially, which is why he needed so many figures for his numbers,
and he even provided for the possibility of two storage columns carrying the results of the multiplication
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seemed to think it did, writing “The solution of this difficulty being found, and the discovery of another
principle having been made, namely—that the nature of a function might be indicated by its position—
algebra, in all its most abstract forms, was placed completely within the reach of mechanism” [emphasis
in the original]. What did he mean here? In his autobiography, Babbage pointed out that the value of
any function of any number of variables could be calculated by means of a succession of arithmetical
steps, which in modern computer parlance would be called a “subroutine.” It would then be possible
to arrange by means of cards that the results of a particular subroutine would always be stored in a
prespecified location in the engine. Programs could then be written with the addresses of storage places
as the symbols of mathematical functions. Yet what was placed on the columns would still be numbers,
and Babbage never made plans for the coded addresses on the cards to be modified or used as arguments
in calculations. Although this passage is redolent of suggestions that eventually found applications in
later computer algebra systems, Babbage himself never entered into “the detail of the means employed”
to the extent of drawing up specific plans.
Nonetheless, the Notes by Lady Lovelace contain both subtle and blatant suggestions that the
Analytical Engine was capable of actual symbolic manipulation, as opposed to the manipulation of
numbers that can be interpreted to be part of a symbolic expression. The Notes emphasized that the
operations were separate from the objects being operated on, which were numbers. For example, if the
Analytical Engine were to be instructed to add the numbers on column 1 and column 2, it would be given
an operation card indicating that addition was to take place, and separately, variable cards indicating that
columns 1 and 2 were to be operated on (i.e., that the numbers they represent were to be placed in the
mill).
On the basis of this feature, Lady Lovelace went on to assert, “The operating mechanism can even
be thrown into action independently of any object to operate upon (although of course no result could
then be developed). Again, it might act upon other things besides number, were objects found whose
mutual fundamental relations could be expressed by those of the abstract science of operations, and
which should be also susceptible of adaptations to the action of the operating notation and mechanism
of the engine” [Menabrea, 1842, 694]. From this it seems that Lady Lovelace believed that making the
Analytical Engine a symbolic machine would be merely a matter of changing the objects being operated
on:
It seems to us obvious, however, that where operations are so independent in their mode of acting, it must be easy by means of a few
simple provisions and additions in arranging the mechanism, to bring out a double set of results, viz.: first, the numerical magnitudes
which are the results of operations performed on numerical data. (These results are the primary object of the engine.) Secondly,
the symbolical results to be attached to those numerical results, which symbolical results are no less the necessary and logical
consequences of operations performed upon symbolic data, than are numerical results when the data are numerical. [Menabrea, 1842,
694–695]
The problem that had led Babbage to conclude that it would be “better to construct a new machine
for such purposes” was thus pronounced easily solved. Yet still she had not suggested exactly what
“provisions and additions in arranging the mechanism” would do the trick.
The innovation represented by the use of cards to input data and instructions also led to assertions
similar to those once voiced by Gilberte Périer, who wrote, “The bounds of arithmetic were, however,
outstepped the moment the idea of applying the cards had occurred; and the Analytical Engine does not
occupy common ground with mere ‘calculating machines.’ It holds a position wholly its own; and the
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general symbols, in successions of unlimited variety and extent, a uniting link is established between the
operations of matter and the abstract mental processes of the most abstract branch of mathematical sci-
ence” [Menabrea, 1842, 696–697]. As to the mechanism by which this could be achieved, Ada speculated
that the specific instance in which the Analytical Engine could deal with a specific pair of symbols could
easily be extended and made completely general. Since the sign at the top of a column that indicated
whether the number represented was positive or negative could be manipulated by the Analytical Engine
during the operation of multiplication at least, she concluded the same trick could be extended to deal
with other symbols as well. “To return to the explanation of the diagram: each circle at the top is intended
to contain the algebraic sign + or −, either of which can be substituted for the other, according as the
number represented on the column below is positive or negative. In a similar manner any other purely
symbolical results of algebraical processes might be made to appear in these circles” [Menabrea, 1842,
702]. However, no clear description of how more general symbols were to be represented and manip-
ulated were suggested. In fact, throughout the Sketch what distinguished the symbolic claims from the
numerical claims for the Analytical Engine was the amount of detail employed. When discussing the
computation of the Bernoulli numbers or dealing with the coefficients of polynomials, both numerical
procedures, Menabrea and Lady Lovelace produced detailed descriptions of the steps by which the en-
gine would proceed. By contrast, no specifics were ever given for the representation or manipulation of
symbols, despite the repeated suggestions that such things were possible.
Obviously, the best way to determine the veracity of the claims would be to test them out on an actual
Engine. But what if the engine exists only in the form of a number of plans and drawings, not neces-
sarily to the same scale or invariable as to detail? It is possible from Babbage’s plans to discern certain
mechanical capabilities, and it is reasonable to look at the mathematical capabilities of the machine he
described. But it is worth keeping in mind that, as we have seen, it is easy for inventors and others to
make hyperbolic claims about their inventions, and it is all the easier to make unsubstantiable claims
about machines that were not built. Another example of this tendency occurred as recently as 1946, when
Alan Turing’s supervisor presented his proposal for the ACE computer for the approval of the head of
the Mathematics Division of the National Physical Laboratory. He announced that, “this device is not a
calculating machine in the ordinary sense of the word. One does not need to limit its functions to arith-
metic. It is just as much at home in algebra.”12 Yet the ACE was to be a numerical computer, and it was
not until 1952 that the first examples of symbolic calculation by a computer were successfully achieved.
Nevertheless, several writers have credited the Analytical Engine with being the first machine
capable of doing symbolic mathematics, citing such picturesque assertions by Lady Lovelace as that
the Analytical Engine could “weave algebraic patterns” or could be “symbolical with no less ease.”
None, however, have demonstrated how symbolic computation could have followed from the designs of
its inventor or the descriptions and comments of its publicists.
6. Conclusions
A number of attempts were made to automate mathematics, starting at least in the early 17th century.
All these attempts in practice did not live up to the enthusiastic claims made for them.
12 J.R. Womersley, quoted in Alan Turing: The Enigma [Hodges, 1983, 333].
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that if an Analytical Engine could be built, it could solve, in the manner described, two simultaneous
linear equations in two unknowns. The same may be said of descriptions given by Lady Lovelace of
how the Analytical Engine could compute the Bernoulli numbers. But these procedures were numerical
procedures, since despite any thoughts he may have had for “making an engine work out algebraic
developments . . . without any reference to the value of the letter,” the engine that Babbage designed
was a purely numerical machine, and so any nonnumerical claims made about it were necessarily vague.
Despite repeated suggestions that symbolic manipulation was possible, no specifics were ever given for
the representation or manipulation of symbols. The charts provided by Menabrea and Lady Lovelace
were not really programs. They are more akin to “walkthroughs” that show how the computation would
have been executed. Thus, they too lack the specificity necessary for a machine actually to handle
symbols.
The suggestion that the object that the operations of the Analytical Engine acted upon could be
arbitrarily changed simply ignores the fact that the operations planned were numerical operations
performed upon numbers. It was part of the mechanical structure of the Analytical Engine that the
data were stored in the form of numbers. While using cards to control the Analytical Engine did
potentially give it more power and flexibility, the cards in no way enabled it to “combine together general
symbols.” Extrapolating from the plus and minus symbols at the top of the columns (whose workings
depended upon certain attributes of numbers) to more general symbols constituted an insupportable
generalization.
In his account of the construction of the Difference Engine No. 2, Doron Swade explained that, in
contrast to the Analytical Engine, Babbage had left a complete set of drawings, executed between 1847
and 1849 and representing the culmination of his work as a mechanical engineer [Swade, 2000]. Yet even
these plans presented severe problems in realization: there were uncertainties in such practical matters
as the materials to be used, the exact shapes and tolerances necessary for the gear wheels which were
the basis for the operation of the machine, and the question of lubrication, if any. Actual design flaws
of greater or lesser seriousness also emerged. Some features seemed to be redundant, or of uncertain
function; other seemingly necessary bits of mechanism seemed to be missing, and at least one had to be
redesigned. Thus the construction required not only inspired guesswork, but occasional painfully justified
compromises with 20th century technology.
The chief implication for the Analytical Engine suggested by this saga, over and beyond its revelation
of the interweaving of technical, financial, aesthetic, and public relations considerations, as important
in the 20th as in the 19th century, is that the far more complex, ever-evolving, and always incomplete
Analytical Engine could not have been constructed, not then, and not now. Moreover, the unbuilt state
of the Analytical Engine has important repercussions for the argument of this paper, in that it helped to
obscure the chief obstacle to the realization of mechanical symbolic manipulation in Babbage’s plans.
The plans left by Charles Babbage for his Analytical Engine were for a numerical computer only,
despite claims, both contemporary and later, that it was also capable of symbolic calculation. In this
respect, it followed a long tradition of claims about early calculators. The conditions that permitted such
claims to be made included admiration for the inventor, his need for funding and recognition, the lack of
familiarity on the part of publicists with the technical problems involved, and the fact that the machine
was never built.
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